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Conventional and Unconventional Monetary Policy
Vasco Cúrdia and Michael Woodford
The authors extend a standard New Keynesian model to incorporate heterogeneity in spending
opportunities and two sources of (potentially time-varying) credit spreads and to allow a role for
the central bank’s balance sheet in equilibrium determination. They use the model to investigate
the implications of imperfect financial intermediation for familiar monetary policy prescriptions,
and to consider additional dimensions of central bank policy—variations in the size and composi-
tion of the central bank’s balance sheet and payment of interest on reserves—alongside the tradi-
tional question of the proper choice of setting an operating target for an overnight policy rate. The
authors also give particular attention to the special problems that arise when the policy rate reaches
the zero lower bound. They show that it is possible within a single unified framework to identify
the criteria for policy to be optimal along each dimension. The suggested policy prescriptions apply
equally well when financial markets work efficiently as when they are substantially disrupted and
interest rate policy is constrained by the zero lower bound. (JEL E44, E52)
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, July/August 2010, 92(4), pp. 229-64.
inflation and real GDP alone, such as the Taylor
(1993) rule or common accounts of “flexible
inflation targeting” (Svensson, 1997), may be
inadequate to circumstances of the kind recently
faced.1 As a further, more-specific question, how
should a central bank’s interest rate policy be
affected by the observation that other key interest
rates no longer co-move with the policy rate (the
federal funds rate in the case of the United States)
in the way they typically have in the past? The
dramatically different behavior of the LIBOR-OIS
spread, shown in Figure 1, since August 2007, has
drawn particular comment. Indeed, John Taylor
T
he recent global financial crisis has
confronted central banks with a num-
ber of questions beyond the scope of
many conventional accounts of the
theory of monetary policy. For example, do pro-
jections of the paths of inflation and of aggregate
real activity under some contemplated path for
policy provide a sufficient basis for monetary
policy decisions, or must financial conditions
be given independent weight in such delibera-
tions? That the Fed began aggressively cutting
its target for the federal funds rate in late 2007
and early 2008, while inflation was arguably
increasing and real GDP was not yet known to be
contracting—and has nonetheless often been criti-
cized as responding too slowly in this period—
suggests that familiar prescriptions that focus on
1 See Mishkin (2008) for discussion of some of the considerations
behind the Fed’s relatively aggressive rate cuts in the early part of
the crisis.
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Reserve Bank of St. Louis.himself (Taylor, 2008) has suggested that move-
ments in this spread should be taken into account
in an extension of his famous rule.
In addition to such new questions about 
traditional interest rate policy, the very focus on
interest rate policy as the central question about
monetary policy has been called into question.
The explosive growth of base money in the United
States since September 2008 (shown in Figure 2)
has led many commentators to suggest that the
main instrument of U.S. monetary policy has
changed from an interest rate policy to one often
described as “quantitative easing.” Does it make
sense to regard the supply of bank reserves (or
perhaps the monetary base) as an alternative or
superior operating target for monetary policy?
Does this (as some would argue) become the only
important monetary policy decision once the
overnight rate (the federal funds rate) has reached
the zero lower bound, as it effectively has in the
United States since December 2008 (Figure 3)?
And now that the Federal Reserve has legal author-
ization to pay interest on reserves (under the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008),
how should this additional potential dimension
of policy be used?
The past two years have also seen dramatic
developments in the composition of the asset side
of the Fed’s balance sheet (Figure 4). Whereas the
Fed had largely held Treasury securities on its
balance sheet before the fall of 2007, other kinds
of assets—including both a variety of new “liquid-
ity facilities” and new programs under which the
Fed has essentially become a direct lender to cer-
tain sectors of the economy—have rapidly grown
in importance. How to manage these programs has
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Spread Between the U.S. Dollar LIBOR Rate and the Corresponding OIS Rate
SOURCE: Bloomberg.occupied much of the attention of policymakers
recently. How should one think about the aims of
these programs and the relation of this new com-
ponent of Fed policy to traditional interest rate
policy? Is Federal Reserve credit policy a substi-
tute for interest rate policy, or should it have dif-
ferent goals from those of interest rate policy? 
These are clearly questions that a theory of
monetary policy adequate to our present circum-
stances must address. Yet, not only these questions
received relatively little attention until recently,
but the very models commonly used to evaluate
the effects of alternative prescriptions for mone-
tary policy have little to say about them. Many
New Keynesian (NK) models abstract entirely
from the role of financial intermediation in the
economy (by assuming a representative house-
hold) or assume perfect risk-sharing (to facilitate
aggregation), so that the consequences of financial
disruptions cannot be addressed. Many models
include only a single interest rate (or only a single
interest rate of a given maturity, with long rates
tied to short rates through a no-arbitrage condi-
tion) and hence cannot say anything about the
proper response to changes in spreads. And many
models abstract entirely from the balance sheet
of the central bank, so that questions about the
additional dimensions of policy resulting from
the possibility of varying the size and composi-
tion of the balance sheet cannot be addressed.2
Cúrdia and Woodford





























Liabilities of the Federal Reserve
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board.
2 In a representative-household model, abstraction from the role of
the central bank’s balance sheet in equilibrium determination is
relatively innocuous; in particular, Eggertsson and Woodford (2003)
show that introducing both a large range of possible choices about
the composition of the balance sheet and transactions frictions that
accord a special role to central bank liabilities need not imply any
additional channels through which monetary policy can affect the
economy when the zero lower bound is reached. However, we wish
to reconsider this question in a framework where financial inter-
mediation is both essential and costly.The aim of the research summarized here3 is
to show how such issues can be addressed in a
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
framework. We extend a basic NK model in direc-
tions that are crucial for analysis of the questions
just posed: We introduce (i) nontrivial heterogene-
ity in spending opportunities, so that financial
intermediation matters for the allocation of
resources; (ii) imperfections in private financial
intermediation and the possibility of disruptions
to the efficiency of intermediation for reasons
taken here as exogenous; and (iii) additional
dimensions of central bank policy, by explicitly
considering the role of the central bank’s balance
sheet in equilibrium determination and by allow-
ing central bank liabilities to supply transactions
services. Unlike some other recent approaches to
the introduction of financial intermediation into
NK DSGE models4—which arguably include
some features that allow for greater quantitative
realism—our aim has been to develop a model
that departs from a standard (representative-
household) model in only the most minimal ways
necessary to address the issues raised above. In
this way, we can nest the standard (and extensively
studied) model as a special case of our model so
that the sources of our results and the precise
significance of the new model elements intro-
duced can be more clearly understood.
Cúrdia and Woodford



























FOMC Operating Target for the Federal Funds Rate
NOTE: Beginning with December 2008, the target rate is replaced with a target bank of 0 to 25 basis points.
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board.
3 This paper summarizes results that are explained in greater detail
in Cúrdia and Woodford (2009a, 2009b, 2010).
4 This has been a very active literature of late. See, for example,
Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2007), Faia and Monacelli (2007),
Gerali et al. (2008), and Gertler and Karadi (2009).1. A MODEL WITH MULTIPLE
DIMENSIONS OF MONETARY
POLICY
Here we sketch the key elements of our model,
which extends the model introduced in Cúrdia
and Woodford (2009a), to introduce the additional
dimensions of policy associated with the central
bank’s balance sheet. (See this earlier paper, espe-
cially its technical appendix, for more details.)
We stress the similarity between the model devel-
oped there and the basic NK model and show how
the standard model is recovered as a special case
of the extended model. 
1.1 Heterogeneity and the Allocative
Consequences of Credit Spreads
Our model is a relatively simple generalization
of the basic NK model used by Goodfriend and
King (1997), Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999),
Woodford (2003), and others to analyze optimal
monetary policy. The model is still highly stylized
in many respects; for example, we abstract from
the distinction between the household and firm
sectors of the economy and instead treat all private
expenditure as the expenditure of infinitely lived
household-firms. Similarly, we abstract from the
consequences of investment spending for the
evolution of the economy’s productive capacity,
Cúrdia and Woodford


































Assets of the Federal Reserve
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board.instead treating all private expenditure as if it
were nondurable consumer expenditure (yielding
immediate utility at a diminishing marginal rate).
We depart from the assumption of a represen-
tative household in the standard model by suppos-
ing that households differ in their preferences.
Each household i seeks to maximize a discounted
intertemporal objective of the form
(1) 
where τ￿i￿ ￿ {b,s} indicates the household’s “type”
in period t. Here ub￿c;ʾ￿ and us￿c;ʾ￿ are two differ-
ent period utility functions, each of which may
also be shifted by the vector of aggregate taste
shocks, ʾt and ʽb￿h;ʾ￿ and ʽs￿h;ʾ￿ are correspond-
ingly two different functions indicating the period
disutility from working for the two types. As in
the basic NK model, there is assumed to be a con-
tinuum of differentiated goods, each produced
by a monopolistically competitive supplier; ct￿i￿
is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator of the household’s
purchases of these differentiated goods. The
household similarly supplies a continuum of
different types of specialized labor, indexed by j,
that are hired by firms in different sectors of the
economy; the additively separable disutility of
work, ʽτ￿h;ʾ￿, is the same for each type of labor,
though it depends on the household’s type and
the common taste shock.
Each agent’s type, τt￿i￿, evolves as an inde-
pendent two-state Markov chain. Specifically, we
assume that each period, with probability 1 – ʴ
(for some 0 ≤ ʴ < 1), an event occurs that results
in a new type for the household being drawn;
otherwise it remains the same as in the previous
period. When a new type is drawn, it is b with
probability ˀb and s with probability ˀs, where 
0 < ˀb,ˀs < 1, ˀb + ˀs +1. (Hence the population
fractions of the two types are constant at all times
and equal to ˀτ for each type τ.) We assume more-
over that uc
b￿c;ʾ￿ > uc
s￿c;ʾ￿ when expenditure, c,
falls in the range of values that occur in equilib-
rium. (See Figure 5, where these functions are
graphed in the case of the calibration, which shows
the functions uc
b￿c￿ and uc
s￿c￿ used in the numeri-
cal work reported here.) Hence a change in a
household’s type changes its relative impatience




















to consume, given the aggregate state ʾt; in addi-
tion, each household’s current impatience to
consume depends on the aggregate state ʾt. We
also assume that the marginal utility of additional
expenditure diminishes at different rates for the
two household types (see Figure 5); type b house-
holds (who are borrowers in equilibrium) have a
marginal utility that varies less with the current
level of expenditure, resulting in a greater degree
of intertemporal substitution of their expenditures
in response to interest rate changes. Finally, the
two types are also assumed to differ in the marginal
disutility of working a given number of hours;
this difference is calibrated so that the two types
choose to work the same number of hours in steady
state, despite their differing marginal utilities of
income. For simplicity, the elasticities of labor
supply of the two types are not assumed to differ.
The coexistence of the two types with differ-
ing impatience to consume creates a social func-
tion for financial intermediation. In the present
model, as in the basic NK model, all output is
consumed either by households or by the govern-
ment; hence intermediation serves an allocative
function only to the extent that there are reasons
for the intertemporal marginal rates of substitution
of households to differ in the absence of financial
flows. The present model reduces to the standard
representative-household model in the case that
one assumes that ub￿c;ʾ￿ = us￿c;ʾ￿ and ʽb￿h;ʾ￿ =
ʽs￿h;ʾ￿.
We assume the following: that households
generally are able to spend an amount different
from their current income only by depositing
funds with or borrowing from financial interme-
diaries; that the same nominal interest rate it
d is
available to all savers; and that a (possibly) differ-
ent nominal interest it
b is available to all borrow-
ers,5 independent of the quantities that a given
household chooses to save or to borrow. For sim-
plicity, we also assume that only one-period risk-
less nominal contracts with the intermediary are
possible for either savers and borrowers. The
assumption that households cannot engage in
financial contracting other than through the inter-
Cúrdia and Woodford
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5 Here “savers” and “borrowers” identify households according to
whether they choose to save or borrow and not according to their
type.mediary sector represents one of the key financial
frictions. We also allow households to hold one-
period riskless nominal government debt. But,
because government debt and deposits with inter-
mediaries are perfect substitutes as investments,
households must pay the same interest rate it
d in
equilibrium and their decision problem is the
same as the case in which they have only one
decision about how much to deposit with or bor-
row from intermediaries.
Aggregation is simplified by assuming that
households are able to sign state-contingent con-
tracts with one another, through which they may
insure one another against both aggregate risk and
the idiosyncratic risk associated with a house-
hold’s random draw of its type, but also assuming
that households are only intermittently able to
receive transfers from the insurance agency;
between these infrequent occasions when a
household has access to the insurance agency, 
it can only save or borrow through the financial
intermediary sector mentioned previously. The
assumption that households are eventually able
to make transfers to one another in accordance
with an insurance contract signed earlier means
that they continue to have identical expectations
regarding their marginal utilities of income far
enough in the future, regardless of their differing
type histories.
It then turns out that in equilibrium, the mar-
ginal utility of a given household at any point in
time depends only on its type τt￿i￿ at that time;
hence the entire distribution of marginal utilities
of income at any time can be summarized by two
state variables, λt
b and λt
s, indicating the marginal
utilities of each of the two household types. The
Cúrdia and Woodford
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Marginal Utilities of Consumption for Two Household Types
NOTE: The values of c –s and c –b indicate steady-state consumption levels of the two types, and λ
–s and λ
–b their corresponding steady-
state marginal utilities.expenditure level of type τ is also the same for all
households of that type and can be obtained by
inverting the marginal-utility functions (graphed
in Figure 5) to yield an expenditure demand func-
tion cτ￿λ;ʾt￿ for each type. Aggregate demand Yt
for the Dixit-Stiglitz composite good can then be
written as 
(2)  
where Gt indicates the (exogenous) level of gov-
ernment purchases, and ʞt indicates resources
consumed by intermediaries (the sum of two
components, Xit
p representing costs of the private
intermediaries and ʞt
cb representing costs of cen-
tral bank activities, each discussed further below).
Thus the effects of financial conditions on aggre-
gate demand can be summarized by tracking 
the evolution of the two state variables λt
τ. The
marginal-utility ratio Ωt ￿ λt
b/λt
s ≥ 1 provides an
important measure of the inefficiency of the allo-
cation of expenditure owing to imperfect financial
intermediation—since, in the case of frictionless
financial markets, we would have Ωt = 1 at all
times.
In the presence of heterogeneity, instead of a
single Euler equation each period relating the path
of the marginal utility of income of the represen-
tative household to the model’s single interest rate,
we have two Euler equations each period, one
for each household type and each involving a
different interest rate: it
b for type b households
(who choose to borrow in equilibrium) and it
d for
type s households (who choose to save). If we log-
linearize these Euler equations,6 and combine
them with a log-linearized version of (2), we obtain
a structural relation of the form
(3)  
generalizing the “intertemporal IS relation” of
the basic NK model. Here Y ˆ
t ￿ log￿Yt/Y –￿ measures








t t t = + + + ( ) ( ) π λ ʾ π λ ʾ ; ; , ʞ
ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ




t t t t t t
t t




σ π 1 1 1
1
∆
∆ʞ σ σ σ ˈ s s E t t t Ω Ω Ω Ω Ω ˆ ˆ + + ( ) +1,
the percentage deviation of aggregate output from
its steady-state level; 
is the average of the interest rates that are rele-
vant (at the margin) for all of the savers and
borrowers in the economy, where we define 
ît
τ ￿ log￿1+ it
τ/1 + ı –τ￿ for τ ￿ {b,d};7 gt is a compos-
ite “autonomous expenditure” disturbance as in
Woodford (2003, pp. 80, 249), taking account of
exogenous fluctuations in Gt, as well as exogenous
variation in the spending opportunities facing the
two types of households (reflected in the depend-
ence of the functions uτ￿c;ʾt￿ on the state vector
ʾt); ʞ ˆ
t ￿￿ ʞt – ʞ –￿/Y – measures departures of the
quantity of resources consumed by the inter-
mediary sector from its steady-state level8; and
Ω ˆ
t ￿ log￿Ωt/Ω –￿ measures the gap between the
marginal utilities of the two household types.
Note that the first four terms on the right-hand
side of (3) are exactly as in the basic NK model,
except for these differences: (i) instead of “the”
interest rate we have an average interest rate; (ii)
σ – is no longer the intertemporal elasticity of sub-
stitution for the representative household, but
instead a weighted average of the corresponding
parameters for the two types; and (iii) the compos-
ite disturbance, gt, similarly averages the changes
in spending opportunities for the two types. The
crucial differences are the presence of the new
terms involving ʞ ˆ
t and Ω ˆ
t, which exist only in the
case of financial frictions. The sign of the coeffi-
cient sΩ depends on the asymmetry of the degrees
of interest sensitivity of expenditure by the two
types; in the case shown in Figure 5 (which we
regard as the empirically relevant case), sΩ > 0
because the intertemporal elasticity of expendi-
ture is higher for type b.9 In this case, a larger
value of Ω ˆ
t reduces aggregate demand for given
expectations about the forward path of average





d ≡ + π π
6 Here and in the case of all other log-linearizations discussed below,
we log-linearize around a deterministic steady state in which the
inflation rate is zero and aggregate output is constant.
Cúrdia and Woodford
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7 One can show that, for a log-linear approximation, the average
marginal utility of income in the population depends only on the
expected path of this particular average of the interest rates in the
economy.
8 We adopt this notation so that ʞ ˆ
t is defined even when the model
is parameterized so that ʞ – = 0.
9 In our calibration, ˈΩ is a small negative quantity, but because it
is small its sign is not of great importance.real interest rates; this can be thought of as rep-
resenting “financial headwinds” of a kind some-
times discussed within the Federal Reserve 
system.10





d is the short-term credit spread
and ʴ ˆ is a coefficient satisfying 0 < ʴ ˆ <1. Thus the
marginal-utility gap, Ω ˆ
t, is a forward-looking mov-
ing average of the expected path of the short-term
credit spread. Alternatively, we can view Ω ˆ
t
itself as a credit spread, a positive multiple of the
spread between two long-term yields, 
for τ ￿ {b,d}. Hence the terms in (3) involving Ω ˆ
t
indicate that variations in credit spreads are rele-
vant to aggregate demand. Credit spreads are also
relevant to the relation between the path of the
policy rate11 and aggregate expenditure because
of the identity
(5)  
connecting the policy rate to the interest rate that
appears in (3). Under an assumption of Calvo-
style staggered price adjustment, we similarly
obtain an aggregate supply relation that is only
slightly different from the “NK Phillips curve” of





n (the “natural rate of output”) is a com-
posite exogenous disturbance that depends on
technology, preferences, and government pur-
chases; ut (the “cost-push shock”) is another com-
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ Ω Ω t t t t E = + + ˉ ʴ 1,
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1 Ω ʞ Ω ʞ ,
posite exogenous disturbance that depends on
variations in distorting taxes and in the degree of
market power in labor or product markets; and
the coefficients satisfy κ, κʞ > 0 and, in the case
that we regard as realistic, κΩ > 0 as well. Here the
first three terms on the right-hand side are iden-
tical to those of the standard “NK Phillips curve,”
subject to similar comments as above about the
dependence of κ on a weighted average of the
intertemporal elasticities of substitution of the two
types and the dependence of Y ˆ
t
n on a weighted
average of the preference shocks of the two types;
the final two terms appear only as a result of credit
frictions. We note in particular that increases in
credit spreads shift both the aggregate-supply
and aggregate-demand relations in our model.
In the presence of heterogeneity, household
behavior results in one further structural equation
that has no analog in the representative-household
model. This is a law of motion for bt, the per capita
level of private borrowing, which depends on the
fluctuations in the levels of expenditure of the
two types and, hence, on the fluctuations in both
marginal utilities λt
τ. Details of this additional
relationship are provided in Cúrdia and Woodford
(2009a). We also suppose that the government
issues one-period riskless nominal debt, the real
value of which at the end of period t is denoted
bt
g. We treat {bt
g} as an exogenous process; this is
one of three independent fiscal disturbances that
we allow for.12 We suppose that government debt
can be held either by saving households or by the
central bank,13 and in equilibrium we suppose
that at least part of the public debt is always held
by households. Since government debt is a perfect
substitute for deposits with the intermediaries in
our model, from the standpoint of saving house-
holds, in equilibrium the yield on government
debt must always equal it
d, the competitive interest
rate on deposits.
Cúrdia and Woodford
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10 See, for example, the reference by Alan Greenspan (1997) to the
U.S. economy in the early 1990s as “trying to advance in the face
of fifty-mile-an-hour headwinds,” owing to “severe credit con-
straint.” The point of the metaphor was that under such conditions,
a given reduction in the federal funds rate stimulated less expen-
diture than it ordinarily would have.
11 The identification of it
d with the policy rate is discussed below in
Section 1.3.
12 The other two disturbances are exogenous variations in government
purchases, Gt, of the composite good and exogenous variations in
a proportional sales tax rate.
13 We could also allow intermediaries to hold government debt, but
they will choose not to as long as it
b > it
d, as is always true in the
equilibria that we consider.1.2 Financial Intermediaries
We assume an intermediary sector made up
of identical, perfectly competitive firms. Inter  -
mediaries take deposits on which they promise
to pay a riskless nominal return, it
d, one-period
later, and make one-period loans on which they
demand a nominal interest rate it
b. An intermedi-
ary also chooses a quantity of reserves, Mt, to hold
at the central bank, on which it will receive a
nominal interest yield it
m. Each intermediary takes
as given all three of these interest rates. We assume
that arbitrage by intermediaries need not eliminate
the spread between it
b and it
d for either of two rea-
sons: (i) Resources are used in the process of loan
origination or (ii) intermediaries may be unable
to tell the difference between good borrowers
(who will repay their loans the next period) and
bad borrowers (who will be able to disappear with-
out having to pay) and as a consequence may have
to charge a higher interest rate to good and bad
borrowers alike.
We suppose that origination of good loans in
real quantity Lt requires an intermediary to also
originate bad loans in quantity ˇt￿Lt￿, where ˇt′,
ˇt′′ ≥ 0, and the function ˇt￿L￿ may shift from
period to period for exogenous reasons. (While
the intermediary is assumed to be unable to dis-
criminate between good and bad loans, it is able
to predict the fraction of loans that will be bad in
the case of any given scale of its lending activity.)
This scale of operations also requires the inter-
mediary to consume real resources ʞt
p￿Lt;mt￿ in
the period in which the loans are originated,
where mt ￿ Mt/Pt, and ʞt
p￿L;m￿ is a convex func-
tion of its two arguments, with ʞ
p





Lmt ≤ 0. We further suppose that for any scale of
operations, L, there exists a finite satiation level
of reserve balances, m –
t￿L￿, defined as the lowest
value of m for which ʞ
p
mt￿L;m￿ = 0. (Our convexity
and sign assumptions then imply that ʞ
p
mt￿L;m￿ = 0
for all m > m –
t￿L￿.) We assume the existence of a
finite satiation level of reserves for an equilibrium
to be possible in which the policy rate is driven
to zero, a situation of considerable practical rele-
vance at present.
Given an intermediary’s choice of its scale of
lending operations, Lt, and reserve balances, mt,
to hold, we assume that it acquires real deposits,
dt, in the maximum quantity that it can repay
(with interest at the competitive rate) from the
anticipated returns on its assets (taking into
account the anticipated losses on bad loans). Thus
it chooses dt such that 
The deposits that it does not use to finance either
loans or the acquisition of reserve balances, 
are distributed as earnings to its shareholders.
The intermediary chooses Lt and mt each period








Equation (7) can be viewed as determining the
equilibrium credit spread, ˉt, as a function
ˉt￿Lt;mt￿ of the aggregate volume of private credit
and the real supply of reserves.14 As indicated
above, a positive credit spread exists in equilib-
rium to the extent that ʞt
p￿L;m￿, ˇt￿L￿, or both are
increasing in L. Equation (8) similarly indicates
how the equilibrium differential ʴt
m between the
interest paid on deposits and that paid on reserves
at the central bank is determined by the same two
aggregate quantities.
In addition to these two equilibrium condi-
tions that determine the two interest rate spreads
in the model, the absolute level of (real) interest
rates must be such that the supply and demand
for credit are equal. Market clearing in the credit
market requires that
(9)  







d m L L L m t t t t t t
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b L L t t t
cb = + ,
14 Note that in terms of this definition of the credit spread, ˉt, the
previously defined deviation corresponds to ˉ ˆt ￿ log￿1 + ˉt/1 + ˉ –￿.
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cb represents real lending to the private
sector by the central bank, as discussed next.
1.3 The Central Bank and Interest Rate
Determination
In our model, the central bank’s liabilities
consist of the reserves, Mt, (which also constitute
the monetary base) on which it pays interest at
the rate it
m. These liabilities in turn fund the cen-
tral bank’s holdings of government debt and any
lending by the central bank to type b households.
We let Lt
cb denote the real quantity of lending by
the central bank to the private sector; the central
bank’s holdings of government debt are then given
by the residual mt – Lt
cb. We can treat mt (or Mt)
and Lt
cb as the bank’s choice variables, subject to
the following constraints: 
(10) 
It is also necessary that the central bank’s choices
of these two variables also satisfy the bound 
where bt
g is the total outstanding real public debt,
so that a positive quantity of public debt remains
in the portfolios of households. In the calculations
below, however, we assume that this last con-
straint is never binding. (We confirm this in our
numerical examples.)
We assume that central bank extension of
credit other than through open-market purchases
of Treasury securities consumes real resources,
just as in the case of private intermediaries, and
represent this resource cost by a function ʞcb￿Lt
cb￿,
discussed further in Section 4, which is increasing
and at least weakly convex, with ʞcb′￿0￿ > 0.
The central bank has one further independent
choice to make each period, which is the rate of
interest it
m to pay on reserves. We assume that if
the central bank lends to the private sector, it sim-
ply chooses the amount that it is willing to lend
and auctions these funds, so that in equilibrium
it charges the same interest rate it
b on its lending
that private intermediaries do; this is therefore
not an additional choice variable for the central
bank. Similarly, the central bank receives the
0 ≤ ≤ L m t
cb
t.
m L b t t
cb
t
g < + ,
market-determined yield it
d on its holdings of
government debt. 
The interest rate it
d at which intermediaries
are able to fund themselves is determined each
period by the joint inequalities 
(11) 
(12) 
together with the “complementary slackness”
condition that at least one of these—(11) and/or
(12)—must hold with equality each period; here
mt
d￿L,ʴm￿ is the demand for reserves defined by (8),
defined to equal the satiation level m –
t￿L￿ in the
case that ʴm = 0. (Condition (11) may hold only
as an inequality, as intermediaries will be willing
to hold reserves beyond the satiation level as long
as the opportunity cost, ʴt
m, is zero.) We identify
the rate it
d at which intermediaries fund themselves
with the central bank’s policy rate (e.g., the federal
funds rate in the case of the United States). 
The central bank can influence the policy
rate through two channels: its control of the sup-
ply of reserves and its control of the interest rate
paid on them. By varying mt, the central bank can
change the equilibrium differential, ʴ t
m, deter-
mined as the solution to (11) and (12). And by
varying it
m, it can change the level of the policy
rate, it
d, that corresponds to a given differential.
Through appropriate adjustment on both margins,
the central bank can control it
d and it
m separately
(subject to the constraint that it
m cannot exceed
it
d). We also assume that for institutional reasons,
it is not possible for the central bank to pay a nega-
tive interest rate on reserves. (We may suppose
that intermediaries have the option of holding
currency, earning zero interest, as a substitute
for reserves, and that the second argument of the
resource cost function, ʞt
p￿b;m￿, is actually the
sum of reserve balances at the central bank plus
vault cash.) Hence the central bank’s choice of
these variables is subject to the constraints 
(13) 
In our model, there are thus three independent
dimensions along which central bank policy can
m m L t t
d
t t
m ≥ ( ) , , ʴ
ʴt
m ≥ 0,
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supplied; the interest rate it
m paid on those
reserves; and the breakdown of central bank assets
between government debt and lending Lt
cb to the
private sector. Alternatively, we can specify these
three independent dimensions as (i) interest rate
policy, the central bank’s choice of an operating
target for the policy rate, it
d; (ii) reserve-supply
policy, the choice of Mt, which in turn implies
a unique rate of interest it
m that must be paid on
reserves for the reserve-supply policy to be con-
sistent with the bank’s target for the policy rate15;
and (iii) credit policy, the central bank’s choice
of the quantity of funds Lt
cb to lend to the private
sector. We prefer this last identification of the
three dimensions of policy because in this case
our first dimension (interest rate policy) corre-
sponds to the sole dimension of policy empha-
sized in many conventional analyses of optimal
monetary policy; the first two are additional
dimensions of policy introduced by our extension
of the basic NK model.16 Changes in central bank
policy along each of these dimensions has conse-
quences for the bank’s cash flow, but we abstract
from any constraint on the joint choice of the
three variables associated with cash-flow con-
cerns. (We assume that seignorage revenues are
simply turned over to the Treasury, where their
only effect is to change the size of lump-sum
transfers to the households.)
Given that central bank policy can be inde-
pendently varied along each of these three dimen-
sions, we can independently discuss the criteria for
policy to be optimal along each dimension. Below,
we take up each of the three dimensions in turn.
1.4 The Welfare Objective
In considering optimal policy, we take the
objective of policy to be the maximization of
average expected utility. Thus we can express
the objective as maximization of 
(14) 
where the welfare contribution, Ut, each period
weights the period utility of each of the two types
by their respective population fractions at each
point in time. As shown in Cúrdia and Woodford
(2009a),17 this can be written as 
(15) 
Here ∆t is an index of price dispersion in period t,
taking its minimum possible value of 1 when the
prices of all goods are identical; for any given total
quantity Yt of the composite good that must be
produced, the total disutility of working indicated
in (1) is greater the more dispersed are prices, as
this implies a correspondingly less uniform (and
hence less efficient) composition of output. 
The total disutility of working is also a decreas-
ing function of Ωt, since a larger gap between the
marginal utilities of the two types implies a less-
efficient division of labor effort between the two
types. The average utility from consumption is
smaller, for given aggregate output Yt, the larger
is ʞt, since only resources Yt – Gt – ʞt are con-
sumed by households. And the average utility
from consumption is also decreasing in Ωt, since
a larger marginal-utility gap implies a less-efficient
division of expenditure between the two types.
Thus the derived utility U￿.￿ is a concave function
of Yt that reaches an interior maximum for given
values of the other arguments, and a monotoni-
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15 We might choose to call the second dimension “variation in the
interest rate paid on reserves,” which would correspond to some-
thing that the Board of Governors makes an explicit decision about
under current U.S. institutional arrangements, as is also true at
most other central banks. But describing the second dimension of
policy as “reserve-supply policy” allows us to address the question
of the value of “quantitative easing” under this heading as well.
16 Goodfriend (2009) similarly describes central bank policy as involv-
ing three independent dimensions. These correspond to our first
three dimensions, but he calls the first dimension (the quantity of
reserves, or base money) “monetary policy.” We believe that this
does not correspond to standard usage of the term “monetary policy,”
since the traditional focus of Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) deliberations about monetary policy has been the choice
of an operating target for the policy rate, as is generally the case
for central banks. Reis (2009) also distinguishes among the three
dimensions of policy in terms similar to ours.
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17 Cúrdia and Woodford (2009a) analyze a special case of the present
model in which central bank lending and the role of central bank
liabilities in reducing the transactions costs of intermediaries are
abstracted from. However, the form of the welfare measure (15)
depends only on the nature of the heterogeneity in our model, and
the assumed existence of a credit spread and of resources consumed
by the intermediary sector; the functions that determine how Ωt
and ʞt are endogenously determined are irrelevant for this calcula-
tion, and those are the only parts of the model that are generalized
in this paper. Hence the form of the welfare objective in terms of
these variables remains the same.dependence of U￿.￿ on Yt and ∆t is the same as in
the representative-household model of Benigno
and Woodford (2005), while the dependence on
Ωt and ʞt indicates new distortions resulting
from the credit frictions in our model.
As in Benigno and Woodford, the assumption
of Calvo-style price adjustment implies that the
index of price dispersion evolves according to a
law of motion of the form 
where for a given value of ∆t–1, h￿∆t–1,.￿ has an
interior minimum at an inflation rate that is near
zero when ∆t–1 is near 1. Thus for given paths of
the variables {Ωt,ʞt} welfare is maximized by trying
(to the extent possible) to simultaneously keep
aggregate output near the (time-varying) level that
maximizes U and inflation near the (always low)
level that minimizes price dispersion. Hence our
model continues to justify concerns about output
and inflation stabilization common to the NK lit-
erature. However, it also implies that welfare can
be increased by reducing credit spreads and the
real resources consumed in financial intermedia-
tion. These latter concerns make the effects of
policy on the evolution of aggregate credit and
on the supply of bank reserves also relevant to
monetary policy deliberations. We now turn to
the question of how each of the three dimensions
of central bank policy can effect these several
objectives.
2. OPTIMAL POLICY: THE SUPPLY
OF RESERVES
We shall first consider optimal policy with
regard to the supply of reserves, taking as given
(for now) the way in which the central bank
chooses its operating target for the policy rate, it
d
and the state-contingent level of central bank lend-
ing to the private sector, Lt
cb. Under fairly weak
assumptions, we obtain a very simple result:
Optimal policy requires that intermediaries be
satiated in reserves, that is, that Mt/Pt ≥ m –
t￿Lt￿ at
all times.
For levels of reserves below the satiation point,
an increase in the supply of reserves has two
∆ ∆ t t t h = ( ) −1, , π
effects relevant for welfare: The resource cost of
financial intermediation, ʞt
p, is reduced (for a given
level of lending by the intermediary sector), and
the credit spread, ˉt, is reduced (again, for a given
level of lending) as a consequence of (7). Each of
these effects raises the value of the objective in
(14); note that the reductions in credit spreads
increase welfare because of their effect on the path
of the marginal-utility gap, Ωt, as a consequence
of (4). Hence an increase in the supply of reserves
is unambiguously desirable in any period in which
they remain below the satiation level.18 Once
reserves are at or above the satiation level, how-
ever, further increases reduce neither the resource
costs of intermediaries nor equilibrium credit




Lmt = 0), so there
would be no further improvement in welfare.
Hence policy is optimal along this dimension if
and only if Mt/Pt ≥ m –
t￿Lt￿ at all times,19 so that 
(16) 
This is just another example in which the
familiar Friedman rule for “the optimum quantity
of money” (Friedman, 1969) applies. Note, how-
ever, that our result has no consequences for
interest rate policy. While the Friedman rule is
sometimes taken to imply a strong result about
the optimal control of short-term nominal interest
rates—namely, that the nominal interest rate
should equal zero at all times—the efficiency
condition (16), together with the equilibrium
relation (8), implies only that the interest rate
differential, ʴt
m, should equal zero at all times.
With zero interest on reserves, this would also
require that it
d = 0 at all times; but given that the
central bank is free to set any level of interest on
reserves consistent with (13), the efficiency con-
dition (16) actually implies no restriction on either
the average level or the degree of state-contingency




t t L m ; . ( ) = 0
Cúrdia and Woodford
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW JULY/AUGUST 2010 241
18 The discussion here assumes that the upper bound in (10) is not a
binding constraint. But if that constraint does bind, then an increase
in the supply of reserves relaxes the constraint, and this too increases
welfare, so that the conclusion in the text is unchanged.
19 To be more precise, policy is optimal if and only if (16) is satisfied
and the upper bound in (10) does not bind. Both conditions will
be satisfied by any quantity of reserves above some finite level.2.1 Is a Reserve-Supply Target Needed? 
Our result about the importance of ensuring
an adequate supply of reserves might suggest that
the question of the correct target level of reserves
at each point in time should receive the same
degree of attention at meetings of the FOMC as
the question of the correct operating target for
the federal funds rate. But deliberations of that
kind are not needed to ensure fulfillment of the
optimality criterion (16); the efficiency condition
can alternatively be stated (using (8)) as requiring
that it
d = it
m at all times. Reserves should be sup-
plied to the point at which the policy rate falls to
the level of the interest rate paid on reserves, or,
in a formulation that is more to the point, interest
should be paid on reserves at the central bank’s
target for the policy rate.
Given a rule for setting an operating target
for it
d (discussed in the next section), it
m should
be chosen each period in accordance with the
simple rule
(17) 
When the central bank implements its target for
the policy rate through open-market operations,
it will automatically have to adjust the supply of
reserves to satisfy (16). But this does not require
a central bank’s monetary policy committee (the
FOMC in the case of the United States) to delib-
erate about an appropriate target for reserves at
each meeting; once the target for the policy rate is
chosen (and the interest rate to be paid on reserves
is determined by that, through condition (17)),
the quantity of reserves that must be supplied to
implement the target can be determined by the
bank staff in charge of carrying out the necessary
interventions (the Trading Desk at the New York
Fed in the case of the United States), on the basis
of a more frequent monitoring of market condi-
tions than is possible for the monetary policy
committee.
One obvious way to ensure that the efficiency
condition (17) is satisfied is to adopt a routine
practice of automatically paying interest on
reserves at a rate that is tied to the current operat-
ing target for the policy rate. This is already the





States. At some of those banks, the fixed spread
between the target for the policy rate and the rate
paid on overnight balances at the central bank is
quite small: for example, 25 basis points in the
case of the Bank of Canada; in the case of New
Zealand, the interest rate paid on overnight bal-
ances is the policy rate itself. There are possible
arguments (relating to considerations not reflected
in our simple model) why the optimal spread
might be larger than zero, but it is likely in any
event to be desirable to maintain a constant small
spread rather than treat the question of the interest
rate to be paid on reserves as a separate, discre-
tionary policy decision to be made at each policy
committee meeting. Apart from the efficiency
gains modeled here, such a system should also
help to facilitate the central bank’s control of the
policy rate (Goodfriend, 2002, and Woodford,
2003, Chap. 1, Sec. 3).
2.2 Is There a Role for “Quantitative
Easing”? 
While our analysis implies that it is desirable
to ensure that the supply of reserves never falls
below a certain lower bound, m –
t￿Lt￿ it also implies
that there is no benefit from supplying reserves
beyond that level. There is, however, one impor-
tant exception to this assertion: It can be desirable
to supply reserves beyond the satiation level if
this is necessary to make the optimal quantity of
central bank lending to the private sector, Lt
cb,
consistent with (10). This qualification is impor-
tant when considering the desirability of the mas-
sive expansion in the supply of reserves by the
Fed since September 2008, as shown in Figure 2.
The increase in reserves (shown in Figure 4)
occurred only after the Fed expanded the vari-
ous newly created liquidity and credit facilities
beyond the scale that could be financed simply
by reducing its holdings of Treasury securities
(as had been its policy over the previous year).20
Some have argued, instead, that further expan-
sion of the supply of reserves beyond the level
20 Bernanke (2009) distinguishes between the Federal Reserve policy
of “credit easing” and the type of “quantitative easing” practiced
by the Bank of Japan earlier in the decade, essentially on this
ground.
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of the rate of interest paid on reserves is an impor-
tant additional policy tool in its own right—one
of particular value precisely when a central bank
is no longer able to further reduce its operating
target for the policy rate, owing to the zero lower
bound (as at present in the United States and
many other countries). It is sometimes proposed
that when the zero lower bound is reached, it is
desirable for a central bank’s policy committee
to shift from deliberations, about an interest rate
target to a target for the supply of bank reserves,
as under the Bank of Japan’s policy of “quantita-
tive easing” during the period between March
2001 and March 2006.
Our model provides no support for the view
that such a policy should be effective in stimu-
lating aggregate demand. Indeed, it is possible to
state an irrelevance proposition for quantitative
easing in the context of our model. Let the three
dimensions of central bank policy be described
by functions that specify the operating target for
the policy rate, the supply of reserves, the inter-
est rate to be paid on reserves, and the quantity
of central bank credit as functions of macroeco-
nomic conditions. For the sake of concreteness,
we may suppose that each of these variables is to
be determined by a Taylor-type rule, 
where the functions are such that constraints in
(10) through (13) are satisfied for all values of
the arguments. (Here the vector of exogenous
disturbances, ʾt, on which the reaction functions
may depend, includes the exogenous factors that
shift the function ʞt
p￿L;m￿.) Then our result is that,
given the three functions ˆid￿.￿, ˆim￿.￿, and ˆL￿.￿,
the set of processes {ˀt,Yt,Lt,bt,it
d,it
b,Ωt,∆t} that
constitute possible rational expectations equilib-
ria is the same independent of the choice of the
function ˆm￿.￿ as long as the specification of ˆm￿.￿
is consistent with the other three functions (in
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fied and that (11) holds with equality in all cases
where (12) is a strict inequality).21
Of course, the stipulation that ˆm￿.￿ be con-
sistent with the other functions uniquely deter-
mines what the function must be for all values of
the arguments for which the functions id￿.￿ and
im￿.￿ imply that ʴt
m > 0. However, the class of poli-
cies considered allows for an arbitrary degree of
expansion of reserves beyond the satiation level
in the region where those functions imply that
ʴt
m = 0, and in particular, for an arbitrary degree
of quantitative easing when the zero bound is
reached (i.e., when it
d = it
m = 0). The class of poli-
cies considered includes the popular proposal
under which the quantity of excess reserves should
depend on the degree to which a standard Taylor
rule (unconstrained by the zero bound) would call
for a negative policy rate. Our result implies that
there should be no benefits from such policies.
Our result might seem to be contradicted by
the analysis of Auerbach and Obstfeld (2005), in
which an open market operation that expands the
money supply is found to stimulate real activity
even when the economy is at the zero bound at
the time of the monetary expansion. But their
thought experiment does not correspond to pure
quantitative easing of the kind contemplated in
the above proposition—because they specify
monetary policy in terms of a path for the money
supply and the policy change that they consider
is one that permanently increases the money sup-
ply, so that it remains higher after the economy
has exited from the “liquidity trap” in which the
zero bound is temporarily binding. The contem-
plated policy change is therefore not consistent
with an unchanged reaction function ˆid￿.￿ for
the policy rate, and the effects of the interven-
tion can be understood to be the consequences
of the commitment to a different future interest
rate policy.
Our result implies only that quantitative eas-
ing should be irrelevant under two conditions:
when (i) an increase in reserves finances an
increase in central bank holdings of Treasury
securities, rather than an increase in central bank
Cúrdia and Woodford
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21 This result generalizes the irrelevance result for quantitative easing
in Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) to a model with heterogeneity
and credit frictions.lending to the private sector, and (ii) policy
implies no change in the way that people should
expect future interest rate policy to be conducted.
Our model does allow for real effects of an
increase in central bank lending, Lt
cb, financed by
an increase in the supply of reserves, if private-
sector financial intermediation is inefficient22;
but the real effects of the increased central bank
lending in that case are the same whether the
lending is financed by an increase in the supply
of reserves or by a reduction in central bank hold-
ings of Treasury securities. Our model also allows
for real effects of an announcement that interest
rate policy in the future will be different, as when
a central bank commits itself not to return imme-
diately to its usual Taylor rule as soon as the zero
bound ceases to bind, but promises instead to
maintain policy accommodation for some time
after it would become possible to comply with
the Taylor rule (as discussed in the next section).
But  such a promise (if credible and correctly
understood by the private sector) should increase
output and prevent deflation to the same extent
even if it implies no change in policy during the
period when the zero lower bound binds. 
While our definition of quantitative easing
may seem narrow, the policy of the Bank of Japan
during the period 2001-06 fits our definition fairly
closely. The Bank of Japan’s policy involved the
adoption of a series of progressively higher quan-
titative targets for the supply of reserves. The aim
of the policy was understood to be to increase
the monetary base, rather than to allow the Bank
of Japan to acquire any particular type of assets.
The assets purchased were almost entirely
Japanese government bonds, since credit alloca-
tion to malfunctioning markets was not a goal.
There was no suggestion that the targets of policy
after the end of the zero-interest-rate period would
be any different from before. There was no com-
mitment to maintain the increased quantity of
base money in circulation permanently; and,
indeed, once it was judged time to end the zero-
interest-rate policy, the supply of reserves was
rapidly contracted again (Figure 6).
Our theory suggests that expansion of the
supply of reserves under such circumstances
should have little effect on aggregate demand,
and this seems to have been the case. For example,
as is also shown in Figure 6, despite an increase
in the monetary base of 60 percent during the
first two years of the quantitative easing policy,
and an eventual increase of nearly 75 percent,
nominal GDP never increased at all (relative to
its March 2001 level) during the entire five years
of the policy.23
3. OPTIMAL POLICY: INTEREST
RATE POLICY
We turn now to a second dimension of policy,
the approach taken by the central bank in deter-
mining its operating target for the policy rate
(the federal funds rate in the case of the Federal
Reserve). In this section, we take for granted that
reserve-supply policy is being conducted in the
way recommended in the previous section, that
is, that the rate of interest on reserves will satisfy
(17) at all times. In this case, we can replace the
function ʞt
p￿Lt;mt￿ with 
and the function ˉt￿Lt;mt￿, defined by the left-
hand side of (7), with 
since there will be satiation in reserves at all
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22 This result differs from that obtained in Eggertsson and Woodford
(2003), where changes in the composition of the assets on the
central bank’s balance sheet are also shown to be irrelevant. That
stronger result depends on the assumption of a representative
household (as in Eggertsson and Woodford) or, alternatively, friction-
less financial intermediation.
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23 As indicated in Figure 6, over the first two years of the quantitative-
easing policy, nominal GDP fell by more than 4 percent, despite
extremely rapid growth of base money. While nominal GDP recov-
ered thereafter, it remained below its 2001:Q1 level over the entire
period until 2006:Q4, three quarters after the official end of quan-
titative easing, by which time the monetary base had been reduced
again by more than 20 percent. Moreover, even if the growth of
nominal GDP after 2003:Q1 is regarded as a delayed effect of the
growth in the monetary base two years earlier, this delayed nominal
GDP growth was quite modest relative to the size of the expansion
in base money.
24 Even if at some times mt exceeds m –
t￿Lt￿, this will not affect the
values of ʞ
p
t or ˉt.equilibrium evolution of ʞt
p and ˉt as functions
of the evolution of aggregate private credit, we
can then write the equilibrium conditions of the
model without any reference to the quantity of
reserves or to the interest rate paid on reserves.
We shall also take as given the state-contingent
evolution of central bank lending {Lt
cb}, and ask
how the central bank’s target for the policy rate
should be adjusted in response to shocks to the
economy. In this case the problem considered is
of the form considered in Cúrdia and Woodford
(2009a).
As in a representative-household model with
no financial frictions, a consideration of optimal
interest rate policy requires taking into account
the desired evolution of aggregate output and of
inflation (which affects the objective (14) because
of the consequences of inflation for the evolution
of the price dispersion index, ∆t), given the trade-
off between variations in these two variables
implied by the aggregate-supply relation. While
our model implies that, in the presence of credit
frictions, interest rate policy also has consequences
for the evolution of ʞt and Ωt (which are also
arguments of (15)), owing to its effects on the
volume of lending by the intermediary sector,
the most important effects are the effects on the
paths of output and inflation. The way in which
the paths of output and inflation matter for wel-
fare are essentially the same as in a model with-
Cúrdia and Woodford
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NOTE: The shaded region shows the period of “quantitative easing,” from March 2001 through March 2006.
SOURCE: International Monetary Fund International Financial Statistics and Bank of Japan.out financial frictions, and the nature of the
aggregate-supply tradeoff indicated by (6) remains
the same as well, with credit frictions appearing
mainly as a source of additional shift terms (like
the “cost-push shocks” emphasized in treatments
such as those of Clarida, Gali, and Gertler, 1999).
Hence some of the important conclusions of the
standard literature continue to apply, at least
approximately, even in an environment where
credit frictions are nontrivial and time varying.
3.1 The Robustness of Flexible Inflation
(or Price-Level) Targeting
Benigno and Woodford (2005) show that in
the representative-household version of our
model, optimal interest rate policy can be char-
acterized by the requirement that interest rates be
adjusted so that a certain target criterion is satis-
fied each period.25 To a log-linear approximation,
the optimal target criterion can be expressed as
(18) 
regardless of the degree of steady-state distortions
due to market power or distorting taxes, where 
xt ￿ Y ˆ




* is a function of the exogenous
disturbances to preferences, technology, fiscal
policy, and markups,26 and ˆ is a positive coeffi-
cient. This can be viewed as a form of “flexible
inflation targeting” in the sense of Svensson
(1997): The acceptable near-term inflation pro-
jection should be adjusted by an amount propor-
tional to the projected change in the output gap.
(Farther in the future, there will never be contin-
uing forecastable changes in the output gap; so
the criterion will always require that the projected
path of inflation a few years in the future will
equal an unchanging long-run target value, here
equal to zero.)
π φ t t t x x + − ( ) = −1 0,
The optimal target criterion in the 
representative-household model can alternatively
be expressed in the form
(19) 
where pt is the log of the general price index at
time t. (Note that (18) simply states that the first
difference of p ˜t should be zero each period, so
that p ˜t must never be allowed to change.) This is
an output gap–adjusted price-level target, or the
commitment to a rule of the form in (19), which
is an example of what Hall (1984) calls an “elastic
price standard.” If the target criterion can be ful-
filled precisely each period, the two target criteria
are equivalent; but if it is not always possible for
the central bank to satisfy the target criterion (as
when the zero lower bound is reached, discussed
below), the two commitments are no longer equiv-
alent. In this case, there are actually advantages to
the price-level formulation, as we discuss below.
Cúrdia and Woodford (2009a) show that in a
special limiting case, the target criterion (18) or
alternatively, (19)—continues to be necessary and
sufficient for the optimality of interest rate policy,
even in the model with heterogeneity and credit
frictions. This is the special case in which steady-
state distortions (including the steady-state credit
spread ˉ –) are negligible, though we allow for
shocks that temporarily increase credit spreads
relative to the steady-state level. Real resources
used in financial intermediation are negligible
(so that the shocks that increase credit spreads
are purely due to an increase in the perceived
fraction of bad loans), and the time-varying frac-
tion of bad loans is independent of intermediaries’
scale of operations. In this case, there are no vari-
ations in ʞt and the fluctuations in Ωt are essen-
tially exogenous, so that the welfare-relevant effects
of interest rate policy relate only to its effects on
output and inflation, as in a model without credit
frictions; and the additional terms in the aggregate-
supply tradeoff (6) are purely exogenous distur-
bance terms, so that the derivation of the optimal
target criterion proceeds as in the representative-
household model.
More generally, the target criterion (18) will
not correspond precisely to optimal policy; but
our numerical investigations of calibrated models
 p p x p t t t ≡ + = φ *,
25 For further discussion of targeting regimes as an approach to the
conduct of monetary policy, see Svensson (1997 and 2005),
Svensson and Woodford (2005), or Woodford (2007).
26 In the case that the steady-state level of output under flexible prices
(or with zero inflation) is efficient, Y ˆ
t
* corresponds to variations
in the efficient level of output. When the steady-state level of out-
put under flexible prices is not efficient, the two concepts differ
somewhat; for the more general definition of Y ˆ
t
*, and discussion of
its relation to the efficient level of output and to the flexible-price
equilibrium level of output, see Woodford (2009, section 2).
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reasonably good approximation to the optimal
Ramsey policy, making the prescription of “flexible
inflation targeting” still a useful practical rule of
thumb. Figures 7 through 10 illustrate this, for
one illustrative calibration of our model, now
allowing both ʞt
pand ˉt to vary endogenously with
the volume of private lending.27 Each figure plots
the impulse responses (under a log-linear approxi-
mation to the model dynamics) of several of the
endogenous variables to a particular type of exoge-
nous disturbance, under each of four different
possible specifications of monetary policy: (i) a
simple “Taylor rule” using the coefficients pro-
posed by Taylor (1993); (ii) a “strict inflation-
targeting” regime, under which interest rate policy
is used to ensure that inflation never deviates
from its target level (zero) in response to any
disturbance; (iii) a “flexible inflation-targeting”
regime, under which interest rate policy ensures
that (18) holds each period; and (iv) a fully opti-
mal policy (the solution to the Ramsey policy
problem).
In each of the cases shown (as well as for a
large number of other types of disturbances that
we have considered), the “flexible inflation-
targeting” regime remains a good approximation
to the fully optimal policy, even if it is no longer
precisely the optimal policy. Both types of infla-
tion-targeting regimes are closer to the optimal
policy than is the Taylor rule, which mechanically
responds to observed variations in real activity
without taking account of the types of disturbances
responsible for those variations.28 (The Taylor rule
tightens policy too much in response to increases
in output resulting from productivity growth or
increased government purchases, while it does
not tighten enough in the case of the wage-markup
shock, which causes output to fall even as infla-
tion increases.) But especially in the case of the
wage-markup shock and the shock to government
purchases, the flexible inflation target provides
a better approximation to optimal policy than
would a strict inflation target.
The target criterion (18) continues to provide
a good approximation to optimal policy in the
case of a “purely financial” disturbance as well,
even though such disturbances are not allowed for
in the analysis of Benigno and Woodford (2005).
Figure 10 shows the impulse responses to an
exogenous increase in the function ˇt￿L￿, corre-
sponding to an increase in the fraction of loans
expected to be bad loans, that then gradually shifts
back to its steady-state value. Such a shock tem-
porarily shifts up the value of ˉ –
t￿L￿ for any value
of L and so represents a contraction of the loan
supply for reasons internal to the financial sector.
In equilibrium, such a disturbance results both
in a contraction of private lending (and hence in
equilibrium borrowing bt, as shown in the bottom-
left panel) and in an increase in the equilibrium
credit spread, ˉt (as shown in the middle-right
panel). If the central bank follows the Taylor rule,
such a shock results in both an output contraction
and deflation, but an optimal policy would allow
little of either to occur.29 Again, the flexible
Cúrdia and Woodford
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27 The calibration is discussed further in Cúrdia and Woodford (2009a).
The model parameters that are shared with the representative-
household version of the model are calibrated as in Woodford (2003,
Chap. 6), on the basis of the empirical estimates of Rotemberg and
Woodford (1997). The degree of heterogeneity of the consumption
preferences of the two types is as shown in Figure 5, while the
disutility of labor is the same for the two types, except for a multi-
plicative factor chosen so that in steady state the two types work
the same amount. The steady-state credit spread is calibrated to
equal 2 percent per annum, as in Mehra, Piguillem, and Prescott
(2008), and is attributed entirely to the marginal resource cost of
private financial intermediation, to make the endogeneity of ʞt as
great as possible given the average size of the spread. A highly con-
vex function ʞ –p￿L￿ is also assumed in the numerical results presented
here, to make the endogeneity of the credit spread as great as pos-
sible. If we assume a less convex function for ʞ –p￿L￿ or that a smaller
fraction of the steady-state credit spread is due to real resource
costs, then the special case in which equation (18) is optimal is an
even better approximation than in the case shown in the figures. 
28 Here we assume a rule in which the intercept term representing
the equilibrium real funds rate is a constant, and the output gap is
defined as output relative to a deterministic trend, as in Taylor
(1993). A more sophisticated variant, in which the intercept varies
with variations in the “natural rate of interest,” and the output
gap is defined relative to variations in the “natural rate of output”
(defined as in equation (6)), provides a better approximation to
optimal policy, but still less close an approximation than that
provided by the flexible inflation-targeting rule. The responses to
exogenous disturbances under the more sophisticated form of
Taylor rule are discussed in Cúrdia and Woodford (2009b).
29 Interestingly, the optimal policy does not involve a much larger cut
in the policy rate than occurs under the Taylor rule. The difference
is that under the Taylor rule, the central bank is unwilling to cut
the policy except to the extent that this can be justified by a fall in
inflation or output, and so in equilibrium those must occur; under
the optimal policy, the central bank is willing to cut the policy rate
without requiring inflation or output to decline, and in equilibrium
they do not.inflation-targeting regime provides a reasonable
approximation to what would happen under an
optimal policy commitment. (We obtain a very
similar figure in the case in which the disturbance
is instead an exogenous increase in the marginal
resource cost of private financial intermediation.)
These results provide an answer to one of the
questions posed in the introduction: Does keep-
ing track of the projected paths of inflation and
output alone provide a sufficient basis for judg-
ments about whether monetary policy (by which
interest rate policy is here intended) remains on
track, even during times of financial turmoil?
Our results suggest that, while the target criterion
(18) involving only the projected paths of inflation
and the output gap is not complex enough to
constitute a fully optimal policy in our extended
model, ensuring that (18) holds at all times would
in fact ensure that policy is not too different from
a fully optimal policy commitment—not only in
an environment in which financial intermediation
is imperfect, but even when the main disturbances
to the economy originate in the financial sector and
imply large increases in the size of credit spreads.
It is important to note, however, that our
results do not imply that there is no need for a
Cúrdia and Woodford












































Impulse Responses to a 1 Percent Increase in Total-Factor Productivity, Under Four Alternative
Monetary Policies
SOURCE: Cúrdia and Woodford (2009a).central bank to monitor or respond to financial
conditions. Under the targeting regime recom-
mended here, it is necessary to keep track of the
various exogenous disturbances affecting the
economy, to correctly forecast the evolution of
inflation and output under alternative paths for
the policy rate—and this includes keeping track
of financial disturbances, when these are impor-
tant. The simple Taylor rule, which does not
require the central bank to use information about
any variables other than inflation and real GDP,
would not be an adequate guide to policy.
3.2 A Spread-Adjusted Taylor Rule? 
Might a Taylor rule instead be a sufficient
basis for setting interest rate policy if the standard
Taylor rule is augmented, as proposed by Taylor
(2008), by an adjustment for observed variations
in a credit spread, such as one of the LIBOR-OIS
spreads shown in Figure 1? For the kind of dis-
turbance considered in Figure 10, this type of
adjustment would allow the policy rate to be cut
by more than a full percentage point even in the
absence of any decline in inflation or output—
which is exactly what is necessary to the allow
Cúrdia and Woodford
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Impulse Responses to a 1 Percent Increase in the Wage Markup, Under Four Alternative
Monetary Policies
SOURCE: Cúrdia and Woodford (2009a).the kind of equilibrium responses associated
with the optimal policy commitment.
Cúrdia and Woodford (2009b) consider modi-
fied Taylor rules of this kind in the context of the
same calibrated structural model used in Figures 7
through 10. While they find that the type of spread
adjustment proposed by Taylor (2008) would be
beneficial under some circumstances—such as
the type of disturbance considered in Figure 10—
the desirable degree of adjustment (and even
sometimes the sign of the adjustment) of the policy
rate in response to a change in credit spreads is
not independent of the nature of the disturbance
that causes spreads to change. Even in the case
of “purely financial” disturbances, like the kind
considered in Figure 10, the optimal degree of
response to changes in the credit spread depends
on the degree of anticipated persistence of the
disturbance.
In fact, the targeting regime that we propose
above automatically involves a spread adjustment
of the general type proposed by Taylor (2008).
Given that a change in the credit spread (and in
the anticipated future path of credit spreads,
which determines the marginal-utility gap, Ωt,
because of (4)) affects aggregate demand for any
Cúrdia and Woodford













































Impulse Responses to a 1 Percent Increase in Gt Equal to 1 Percent of Steady-State Output,
Under Four Alternative Monetary Policies
SOURCE: Cúrdia and Woodford (2009a).given anticipated path of the policy rate—both
because of the difference between it
avg and the
policy rate indicated in (5) and because of the Ω ˆ
t
terms in (3)—the consequences of a given path of
the policy rate for the inflation and output pro-
jections will be different when the path of credit
spreads changes, and so the path for the policy
rate required to produce projections that conform
to the target criterion will be different. Since larger
credit spreads (now and in the future) reduce
aggregate demand leading to lower inflation, the
policy rate will generally need to be reduced to
offset this effect.
Moreover, we believe that the targeting
approach represents a conceptually superior
way of introducing these considerations into
decisions about interest rate policy. The Taylor
(2008) proposal requires that one specify which
particular measure of credit spreads will be taken
into account in the modified reaction function.
(Taylor has proposed one very specific spread—
the LIBOR-OIS spread.) But in fact central banks
monitor many different credit spreads; and while
in our highly stylized model there is only a single
credit spread, a more empirically realistic model
would have to include several (as indeed the
Cúrdia and Woodford















































Impulse Responses to a Shift in the Function ˇt(L) that Triples the Size of ˉ –
t(L) for Each Value of L,
Under Four Alternative Monetary Policies
SOURCE: Cúrdia and Woodford (2009a).FRB/U.S. model already does). Under our pro-
posed targeting regime, each of these would be
relevant to setting interest rate policy: Variations
in each of the different spreads would be taken
into account to the extent that they enter the equa-
tions of the model used to project the paths of
inflation and output. Furthermore, under the
targeting approach, the adjustment of the policy
rate would not have to be a mechanical (and purely
contemporaneous) function of the change in the
credit spread; instead, one would automatically
respond differently depending on the nature of the
disturbance and would respond also to changes
in the expected future path of spreads as well as
to the current spread.
3.3 Policy When the Zero Lower Bound
Is Reached
In the discussion above (and in the simula-
tions in Figures 7 through 10), it is assumed that
the zero lower bound on the policy rate is never
reached, and our theoretical model implies that
it should not be reached, in the case of small
enough shocks. But it is theoretically possible
for it to bind in the case of large-enough shocks
of certain types, and recent events in the United
States and elsewhere have shown that one cannot
presume that the constraint will never bind in
practice. (As a practical matter, it seems that it is
most likely to bind following severe disruptions
of the financial sector, as in the case of the Great
Depression, in Japan during the 1990s, and at
present.)
When the zero bound is a binding constraint,
it may not be possible for the central bank to use
interest rate policy to ensure fulfillment of the
target criterion (19) in all periods. Does this affect
the validity of our recommendation of this policy?
Although it may not be possible to fulfill the target
criterion at all times, that does not in itself imply
that it is not desirable to adjust interest rate policy
to fulfill the criterion when it can be satisfied.
Also, nothing here implies that, when policy-
makers deliberate interest rate policy, they should
forgo the question of whether there exists an
interest rate path that would satisfy the target
criterion.
But the fact that the lower bound is sometimes
a binding constraint also has consequences for
the appropriate policy target even under certain
circumstances when the zero lower bound would
not prevent one from achieving the target criterion
(18). The reason is that the severity of the distor-
tions during the period when the lower bound is
binding should depend on the way in which
policy is expected to be conducted after the con-
straint ceases to bind. Hence, the policy that a
central bank should commit to follow in such a
period should be chosen with a view to the con-
sequences of the anticipation of that policy during
the period when the zero bound binds.
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) analyze this
issue in a model that is equivalent to a special
case of the model considered here. Let us again
consider the special case (mentioned in Section
3.1) in which there are no steady-state distortions,
no resources are used in financial intermediation,
and the fraction of bad loans is independent of
the scale of lending. Because in this case both the
credit spread and the marginal-utility gap evolve
exogenously, a second-order Taylor series approxi-
mation to the objective function (14), expanding
around the optimal (zero-inflation) steady state,
is exactly the same quadratic function of inflation
and the output gap as in the case of a representa-
tive-household model (the case considered by
Eggertsson and Woodford). The “intertemporal IS
relation” (3) and the aggregate-supply relation (6)
are also identical to those of the representative-
household model, except for the presence of
additional additive disturbance terms involving
ˉ ˆt and Ω ˆ
t.
The optimal policy problem—which can be
stated as the choice of processes for inflation,
output, and the policy rate consistent with (3),
(6), and (13) each period to maximize the welfare
measure written in terms of output and infla-
tion—is of the same form as the one analyzed by
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), except with
additional possible interpretations of the exoge-
nous disturbance terms. In particular, the exten-
sion of the model to incorporate credit frictions
provides a more empirically realistic interpretation
of the disturbance hypothesized by Eggertsson and
Woodford (2003), which makes the real policy
Cúrdia and Woodford
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gap temporarily negative. Rather than postulate
a sudden, temporary disappearance of real spend-
ing opportunities or a temporary reduction in the
rate of time preference, we can instead attribute
the situation to a temporary increase in credit
spreads as a result of disruption of the financial
sector.
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) show that it
can be a serious mistake for a central bank to be
expected to return immediately to the pursuit of
its normal policy target as soon as the zero bound
no longer prevents it from hitting that target. For
example, Figure 11 (reproduced from their paper)
compares the dynamic paths of the policy rate,
the inflation rate, and aggregate output under two
Cúrdia and Woodford
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW JULY/AUGUST 2010 253


























Equilibrium Responses of the Policy Rate, Inflation, and the Output Gap, Under Two Alternative
Monetary Policies
NOTE: The figure represents equilibrium responses when the expected probability of loan default exogenously increases beginning
in quarter zero and ending in quarter 15.
SOURCE: Eggertsson and Woodford (2003).alternative monetary policies in the case of a real
disturbance (here interpreted as an exogenous
increase in the probability that loans are bad,
requiring intermediaries to increase the credit
spread by several percentage points) that begins
in period zero and lasts for 15 quarters, before
real fundamentals permanently return to their
original (“normal”) state.
In this case, if the financial disturbance were
never to occur, optimal policy would involve
maintaining a zero inflation rate, as this would
also imply a zero output gap in every period. After
the disturbance dissipates, one of the feasible poli-
cies is an immediate return to this zero-inflation
steady state (under the parameterization assumed
in the figure, this involves a nominal interest rate
of 4 percent), and this is optimal from the point
of view of welfare in all periods after the financial
disturbance dissipates. It is not, however, possible
to maintain the zero-inflation steady state at all
times, because during the financial disturbance
this would require the policy rate to equal –2 per-
cent, which would violate the zero lower bound.
One of the policies considered in Figure 10
(dashed lines) is strict (forward-looking) inflation
targeting: The central bank uses interest rate pol-
icy to maintain a zero inflation rate whenever it
is not prevented by the zero lower bound on the
policy rate. When undershooting the inflation
target cannot be avoided, the policy rate is main-
tained at the lower bound. The other policy (solid
lines) is the optimal Ramsey policy, when the zero
lower bound is included among the constraints
on the set of possible equilibria. The forward-
looking inflation-targeting policy is clearly much
worse, as it involves both a much more severe
output contraction and much more severe defla-
tion during the period when the zero bound con-
strains policy.
The problem with the forward-looking infla-
tion-targeting policy is that because the central
bank simply targets zero inflation from the time
that it again becomes possible to do so, all of the
deflation that occurs while the zero bound binds
is fully accommodated by the subsequent policy:
The central bank continues to maintain the price
level at whatever level it has fallen to. This results
in expected deflation during the entire period of
the financial disturbance, for deflation will con-
tinue as long as the financial disruption continues,
while no inflation will be allowed even if the
disturbance dissipates; this expected deflation
makes the zero bound on nominal interest rates
a higher lower bound on the real policy rate, mak-
ing the contraction and deflation worse, giving
people reason to expect more deflation as long as
the disruption continues, and so on in a vicious
circle.
The outcome would be even worse if the
central bank were to seek to achieve the target
criterion (18) each period as soon as it becomes
possible to do so. This is because, once credit
spreads contract again, this policy would require
the central bank to target negative inflation and/or
a negative output gap (even though zero inflation
and a zero output gap would now be achievable),
simply because there had been a large negative
output gap in the recent past (when the zero
bound was a binding constraint); but the expec-
tation of such policy would make the output con-
traction while the zero bound constrained policy
even more severe (justifying even tighter policy
immediately following the “exit” from the “liquid-
ity trap,” and so on).
Under the optimal policy, there is instead a
commitment to maintain accommodative condi-
tions for a brief interval, even though the reduc-
tion in credit spreads means that this level for the
policy rate is now expansionary, leading to a mild
boom and temporary inflation above the long-run
target level (of zero). The expectation that this
will occur during the “exit” from the trap results
in much less contraction of economic activity
and much less deflation, because it makes the
perceived real rate of interest lower at all times
while the policy rate is at zero (given that there
is in each period some probability that credit
spreads will shrink again in the next period, allow-
ing mild inflation to occur). This expectation
results in less deflation and higher real activity
while the lower bound binds; and the expectation
that continuation of the financial stress will have
less drastic consequences is itself a substantial
factor in making those consequences much less
drastic—in a “virtuous circle” that exactly reverses
the logic of our analysis above.
Cúrdia and Woodford
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for people to be able to expect that the “exit” from
the trap will involve mild inflation, it does not
follow that the possibility of occasionally hitting
the zero lower bound on the policy rate is a rea-
son to aim for a substantial positive rate of infla-
tion at all times (as proposed by Summers, 1991)
simply to ensure that a zero nominal interest rate
will always mean a sufficiently negative value of
the real policy rate. To the extent that a history-
dependent inflation target of the kind called for
in Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) can be made
credible and understood by the public, it suffices
that the central bank be committed to bringing
about a temporarily higher rate of inflation only
on the particular occasions when the zero lower
bound has bound in the recent past, and not all
of the time.30
This analysis implies that a commitment to
maintain policy accommodation can play an
important role in mitigating the effects of the zero
lower bound on interest rates. One might reason-
ably ask for what length of time it is sensible to
commit to keep rates low, and in particular
whether it is really prudent to make any lengthy
commitment when it is hard for a central bank to
be certain that recovery may not come much
sooner than anticipated. The answer is that the
best way to formulate such a commitment is not
in terms of a period of time that can be identified
with certainty in advance, but rather in terms of
targets that must be met for the removal of policy
accommodation to be appropriate.
In fact, Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) show
that in the representative-household model (and
hence similarly in the special case described
above), optimal policy can be precisely described,
regardless of the nature of the exogenous distur-
bances,31 by a target criterion involving only
the path of the output gap–adjusted price level
defined in (18). Under the optimal rule, the central
bank has a target each period for p ˜t that depends
only on the economy’s history through period t–1
and must use interest rate policy to achieve the
target, if this is possible without violation of the
zero lower bound; if the target is undershot even
with a zero policy rate, the policy rate is at any
rate reduced to zero—and the target for p ˜t–1 is
increased in proportion to the degree of under-
shooting. In periods when the zero bound does
not bind, the target for the gap-adjusted price level
is not adjusted, and the target criterion is the same
as the one discussed in Section 3.1.
Actually, the adjustments of the target are not
of great importance, even when the zero bound
does bind: Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) show
that almost all of the improvement in stabilization
achievable under the optimal policy commitment
can be obtained by simply committing to a target
criterion of the form in (19) with a constant target
p*. The crucial feature of the optimal policy is
that the target for p ˜t must not be allowed to fall
as a result of having undershot the target in past
periods. Hence one of the approximate character-
izations of optimal policy proposed in Section 3.1
continues to provide a good approximation to
optimal policy even when the zero lower bound
sometimes binds: It is simply important that the
commitment be to the level form of the target cri-
terion (19) rather than to the growth rate form (18).
4. OPTIMAL POLICY: CREDIT
POLICY
We turn now to the final of our three inde-
pendent dimensions of central bank policy,
namely, adjustment of the composition of the asset
side of the central bank’s balance sheet, taking as
given the overall size of the balance sheet (deter-
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30 Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) compare the welfare levels associ-
ated with alternative constant inflation targets and find that the
existence of an occasionally binding zero lower bound does indeed
make the optimal inflation target higher than it would otherwise
be, if one must choose from among this very restrictive class of poli-
cies. But they show that even the best policy in that class involves
much larger average distortions than a price-level targeting policy,
even though a price-level targeting policy implies a long-run average
inflation rate of zero.
31 Their analysis allows for both exogenous variations in the “natural
rate of interest” (which means an additive exogenous term in the
intertemporal IS relation) and in the “cost-push” term (which means
an additive exogenous term in the Phillips-curve tradeoff), evolv-
ing according to arbitrary stochastic processes. Since the effects
of the financial frictions in (3) and (6) are to add additional terms
involving Ω ˆ
t that can be viewed as a combination of these two types
of shifts, the optimal target criterion derived by Eggertsson and
Woodford (2003) continues to apply—under the special assump-
tions stated above—even in the presence of time-varying credit
frictions.mined by the reserve-supply decision discussed
in Section 2). According to the traditional doctrine
of “Treasuries only,” the central bank should not
vary the composition of its balance sheet as a
policy tool. Instead, it should avoid both balance-
sheet risk and the danger of politicization by hold-
ing only (essentially riskless) Treasury securities
at all times, while varying the size of its balance
sheet to achieve its stabilization goals for the
aggregate economy.32
Apart from these prudential concerns, if pri-
vate financial markets can be relied on to allocate
capital efficiently, it is hard to argue that there
would be any substantial value to allowing the
central bank this additional dimension of policy.
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) present a formal
irrelevance proposition in the context of a repre-
sentative-household general-equilibrium model.
In their model, the assets purchased by the central
bank have no consequences for the equilibrium
evolution of output, inflation, or asset prices—
and this is true regardless of whether the central
bank purchases long-term or short-term assets,
nominal or real assets, riskless or risky assets, and
so on. In addition, even in a model with hetero-
geneity of the kind considered here, the compo-
sition of the central bank’s balance sheet would
be irrelevant if we were to assume frictionless
private financial intermediation, since private
intermediaries would be willing to adjust their
portfolios to perfectly offset any changes in the
portfolio of the central bank.
This irrelevance result does not hold, how-
ever, in the presence of credit frictions of the kind
assumed in Section 1; so we can also consider
the optimal use of this additional dimension of
policy if we are willing to suppose that the pru-
dential arguments against the central bank’s
involvement in the allocation of credit should
not be determinative, at least in the case of suffi-
ciently severe financial disruptions. In our model,
an increase in Lt
cb can improve welfare on two
grounds: For a given volume of private borrowing,
bt an increase in Lt
cb allows the volume of private
lending, Lt, to fall, which should reduce both the
resources ʞt
pconsumed by the intermediary sector
and the equilibrium credit spread, ˉt (due to
equilibrium (7)). Under plausible conditions, our
model implies both a positive shadow value ˕ʞ,t
of reductions in ʞt (the Lagrange multiplier associ-
ated with the resource constraint (2)) and a posi-
tive shadow value ˕ˉ,t of reductions in ˉt (the
Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint
(4)); hence an increase in Lt
cb should be desirable
on both grounds.
In the absence of any assumed cost of central
bank credit policy, one can easily obtain the result
that it is always optimal for the central bank to
lend an amount sufficient to allow an equilib-
rium with Lt = 0; that is, the central bank should
substitute for private credit markets altogether.
Of course, we do not regard this as a realistic
conclusion. As a simple way of introducing into
our calculations the fact that the central bank is
unlikely to have a comparative advantage at the
activity of credit allocation under normal circum-
stances, we assume that central bank lending con-
sumes real resources in a quantity ʞcb￿Lt
cb￿, by
analogy with our assumption that real resources,
ʞt
p, are consumed by private intermediaries. The
function ʞcb￿L￿ is assumed to be increasing and
at least weakly convex; in particular, we assume
that ʞcb′￿0￿ > 0 so that there is a positive marginal
resource cost of this activity, even when the cen-
tral bank starts from a balance sheet made up
entirely of Treasury securities.
4.1 When Is Active Credit Policy Justified? 
The first-order conditions for optimal choice
of Lt
cb then become 
(20) 
(21) 
together with the complementary slackness con-
dition that at least one of conditions (20) or (21)
must hold with equality in each period. (Here, the
first expression in square brackets in (20) is the
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32 See Goodfriend (2009) for a discussion of this view and a warning
about the dangers of departing from it.
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second expression in square brackets is the par-
tial derivative of ˉt with respect to Lt
cb under the
same assumption.) 
A “Treasuries only” policy is optimal in the
event of a corner solution, in which (20) is an
inequality, as will be the case if ʞcb′￿0￿ is large
enough. In our view, it is probably most reason-
able to calibrate the model so that this is true in
steady state. Then not only will the optimal pol-
icy involve “Treasuries only” in the steady state,
but (assuming that the inequality is strict at the
steady state) this will continue to be true in the
case of any stochastic disturbances that are small
enough. However, it will remain possible for the
optimal policy to require Lt
cb > 0 in the case of
certain large-enough disturbances. This is espe-
cially likely to be true in the case of large-enough
disruptions of the financial sector of a type that
increase the marginal resource cost of private inter-
mediation (the value of ʞ –p′) and/or the degree to
which increases in private credit require a larger
credit spread (the value of ˉ –′). 
However, not all “purely financial” distur-
bances—by which we mean exogenous shifts in
the functions ʞ –
t
p￿L￿ or ˇt￿L￿ of a type that increase
the equilibrium credit spread ˉ –
t￿L￿ for a given
volume of private credit—are equally likely to
justify an active central bank credit policy on the
grounds just mentioned.33 To illustrate this, let us
consider four different possible purely financial
disturbances, each of which will be assumed to
increase the value of ˉ –
t￿L –￿ by the same number
of percentage points. Here, by an additive shock,
we mean one that translates the schedule ˉ –
t￿L￿
vertically by a constant amount; a multiplicative
shock will instead multiply the entire schedule
ˉ –
t￿L￿ by some constant factor greater than 1. We
shall also distinguish between disturbances that
change the function ʞ –
t￿L￿ (“ʞ shocks”) and distur-
bances that change the function ˇt￿L￿ (“ˇ shocks”).
Thus a “multiplicative ˇ shock” is a change in the
function ˇt￿L￿; as a consequence, of which the
schedule ˉ –
t￿L￿ is multiplied by a factor greater
than 1 for all values of L, and so on.
With the model calibrated as in the numerical
exercises in Figures 7 through 10, Figure 12 plots
the dynamic response of the sum of the three posi-
tive terms on the left-hand side of (20) to each of
these four types of purely financial disturbances.
In these simulations, both interest rate policy and
reserve-supply policy are assumed to be optimal,
as discussed in Sections 2 and 3. We assume in
each case that there is no central bank lending to
the private sector in the equilibrium being com-
puted, but we ask (in the equilibrium computed
under this assumption) what the smallest value
of ʞcb′￿0￿ is at each point in time, for which this
would be consistent with the first-order condition
(21). (Thus an increase in the quantity plotted
means that the marginal benefit of central bank
credit policy is increased, even if in our calcula-
tions no central bank lending actually occurs.)
We divide the sum of the three terms by the value
of ˕ʞ,t, so that the quantity plotted is precisely
the threshold value of ʞcb′￿0￿, expressed in terms
of an interest rate spread. (Since it is an interest
rate spread, we multiply by 4 so that the quantity
on the vertical axis of the figure is in units of per-
centage points per annum.) In the figure, each of
the four disturbances is of a size that increases the
value of ˉ –
t￿L –￿ by 4 percentage points per annum
(i.e., from 2.0 percent to 6.0 percent).
In the absence of any disturbances, the steady-
state value of this quantity is a little less than 3.5
percentage points per annum. This means that a
marginal resource cost of central bank loan origi-
nation of 3.5 percent or higher will suffice to jus-
tify our proposal above—that in the steady state
the optimal quantity of central bank credit is
zero.34 Let us suppose that ʞcb′￿0￿ is equal to 4.0
percent. Then in the absence of shocks, a corner
solution with Treasuries only is optimal. How  -
ever, either a “multiplicative ʞ shock” or an
“additive ʞ shock” of the size assumed would
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33 Our result here is quite different from that in Section 3, where the
consequence of a “purely financial” disturbance for optimal interest
rate policy, taking as given the path of central bank lending to the
private sector, depends (to a first approximation) only on the size of
the shift in ˉ –
t￿L –￿, which is why we do not bother to show the opti-
mal responses to more than one type of purely financial disturbance.
34 Note that this quantity is well above the marginal resource cost of
private lending in the steady state, which we have calibrated at
2.0 percent per annum because our baseline calibration implies a
relatively inelastic private supply of credit: ˉ –
t￿L￿ is steeply increas-
ing with L.cause condition (21) to be violated in the case of
a corner solution; hence optimal policy would
require a positive quantity of central bank lend-
ing. (In the case of the “multiplicative ʞ shock,”
this would be true even if ʞcb′￿0￿ were equal to
5.0 percentage points.)
On the other hand, even in the case of the
“multiplicative ʞ shock,” the threshold required
to justify a corner solution is only above 4 percent
in the quarter of the shock and the quarter imme-
diately following it—despite the fact that in our
numerical experiment the disturbance is assumed
to have an autocorrelation coefficient of 0.9, so
that the shift in the ˉ –
t￿L￿ schedule is still 65 per-
cent of its initial magnitude a year later. This sug-
gests that, even in the case of those disturbances
for which the welfare benefits of central bank
credit policy are greatest, departure from the cor-
ner solution is likely to be justified only for a rel-
atively brief period of time.
4.2 An Example with Active Credit Policy
As an example of how optimal credit policy
can, under some circumstances, substantially
alter the economy’s response to a financial dis-
ruption, Figure 13 considers the optimal response
to a “multiplicative ʞ shock,” under a calibration
in which ʞcb′￿0￿ is assumed to be low enough so
that even in the steady state a corner solution is
not optimal.35 (While this is not the case that we
regard as most realistic, it simplifies the calcula-
Cúrdia and Woodford
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Response of the Critical Threshold Value of ʞcb′(0) for a Corner Solution, Under Four “Purely
Financial” Disturbances
NOTE: For each disturbance, ˉ –
t(L –) increases by 4 percentage points.
35 This alternative calibration is chosen to imply that in the steady
state, only 5 percent of total credit, bt, is supplied by the central bank.tions reported in Figure 13, since it implies that
constraint (21) never binds. We leave for future
work analysis of the more interesting case, in
which (21) binds in some periods and not in
others.) The figure plots the impulse responses
under two alternative assumptions about policy:
With credit, central bank policy is optimal along
all three dimensions (and Lt
cb varies over time);
with no credit, Lt
cb is constrained to equal the
steady-state value L
–cb at all times,36 while interest-
rate policy and reserve-supply policy are optimal.
In addition to the responses of the five vari-
ables plotted in Figures 7 through 10, Figure 13




cb, indicating the deviation of central bank
credit from its steady-state value, expressed as a




Under an optimal use of credit policy, central
bank lending to the private-sector increases sub-
stantially in response to the financial disturbance
(central bank lending increases from 5 percent of
total credit to a little over 9 percent). As a result,
the large increase in the credit spread that would
otherwise occur as a result of the shock is essen-
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Impulse Responses to a Shift in ʞ –
t(L) that Triples the Size of ˉ –
t(L) for Each Value of L, Under
Optimal Interest Rate Policy and Two Alternative Assumptions About Credit Policy
36 We impose the constraint that Lt
cb must equal L –cb, rather than zero,
in the no-credit case, so that the steady state is the same under
both policies.tially prevented from occurring (so that the credit
spread remains close to its steady-state level of
2.0 percent per annum). As a further consequence,
it is not necessary under this policy to cut the
policy rate sharply, as would otherwise be
required by an optimal interest rate policy. The
substantial contraction of credit that would oth-
erwise occur (an eventual contraction of aggre-
gate credit by more than 2 percent a year after
the shock) is largely avoided, and the modest
effects on output and inflation that would occur
even under an optimal interest rate policy in the
absence of an active credit policy are also largely
avoided.
This example indicates that, under at least
some circumstances, our model would support
a fairly aggressive use of active credit policy for
stabilization purposes. We must caution, how-
ever, that these results are quite dependent upon
assumptions about the nature of the financial dis-
turbance. It is equally possible to conclude that
central bank credit should be contracted (assum-
ing that it would be positive to begin with) in
response to a disturbance that increases credit
spreads. If the only form of purely financial dis-
turbance is an “additive ˇ disturbance,” and we
assume that ʞcb￿Lcb￿ is a linear function, then none
of the functions ʞ –p′￿L￿, ʞ –p′′￿L￿, or ˇ′￿L￿ is time
varying and ʞcb′ is a constant. In this case, the
requirement that (20) hold with equality deter-
mines the volume of private credit, Lt, as a time-
invariant function of ˕ˉ,t/˕ʞ,t. In the case of a
disturbance that increases the credit spread, the
resulting decline in credit demand, bt, means that,
for credit supply Lt to be stabilized, Lt
cb would
have to contract; so unless ˕ˉ,t/˕ʞ,t changes to
such an extent that the value of Lt consistent with
(20) falls as much as bt does,37 it is optimal for
Lt
cb to contract (as Figure 12 would also suggest).
In a case of this kind, active credit policy would
actually cause credit to contract by more (and
credit spreads to increase by more) than they
would if the supply of central bank credit did
not respond to the shock.
4.3 Segmented Credit Markets
In the simple model expounded above, there
is a single credit market and single borrowing
rate, it
b, charged for loans in this market. Our dis-
cussion of central bank credit policy has corre-
spondingly simply referred to the optimal quantity
of central bank lending to the private sector over-
all, as if the allocation of this credit is not an issue.
In reality, of course, there are many distinct credit
markets and many different parties to which the
central bank might consider lending. Moreover,
since there is only a potential case to be made for
central bank credit policy when private financial
markets are severely impaired, it does not make
sense to assume efficient allocation of credit among
different classes of borrowers by the private sector,
so that only the total credit extended by the central
bank would matter. Our simple discussion here
has sought merely to clarify the connection that
exists, in principle, between decisions about credit
policy and the other dimensions of credit policy.
An analysis of credit policy that could actually be
used as a basis for credit policy decisions would
instead need to allow for multiple credit markets,
with imperfect arbitrage between them.
We do not here attempt an extension of our
model in that direction. (A simple extension
would be to allow for multiple types of “type b”
households, each only able to borrow in a partic-
ular market with its own borrowing rate and
market-specific frictions for the intermediaries
lending in each of these markets.) We shall simply
note that in such an extension there would be a
distinct first-order condition, analogous to con-
ditions (20) and (21), for each of the segmented
credit markets. There would be no reason to
assume that the question of whether active credit
policy is justified should have a single answer at
a given point in time: Lending might be justified
in one or two specific markets while the corner
solution remained optimal in the other markets.
The conditions that should be appealed to in
order to justify central bank lending are more
microeconomic than macroeconomic: They relate
to the severity of the distortions that have arisen
in particular markets and to the costs of interven-
tion in those particular markets, rather than to
37 Our numerical experiments indicate that this can easily fail to be
the case.
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of whether central bank credit policy is justified—
when it is justifiable to initiate active policy and
when it would be correct to phase out such pro-
grams—should not be questions such as whether
the zero lower bound on interest rate policy binds
or whether the central bank continues to under-
shoot the level of real GDP that it would like to
attain. While aggregate conditions will be one
factor that affects the shadow value of marginal
reductions in the size of credit spreads (repre-
sented by the multiplier ˕ˉ,t in (20)), the value of
this multiplier will likely be different for different
markets and the main determinants of variations
in it are likely to be market specific. This will
apply even more to the other variables that enter
into the first-order condition (20).
Hence it would be a mistake to think of credit
policy as a substitute for interest rate policy, an
alternative tool that can be used to achieve the
same goals and that should be used to achieve the
central bank’s target criterion for inflation and
the output gap when interest rate policy alone is
unable to. Such a concept would be dangerous for
two reasons. On the one hand, it would direct
attention away from the most relevant costs and
benefits when thinking about the appropriate
scale, timing, and allocation of active credit policy.
And on the other hand, it could also allow the
central bank to avoid recognition of the extent to
which the correct target criterion for interest rate
policy needs to be modified as a result of the zero
lower bound—in particular, to avoid the challenge
of shaping expectations about interest rate policy
after the lower bound ceases to bind, on the
ground that credit policy (or “quantitative easing”)
should allow the bank’s usual target criterion to
be achieved continuously, without any need for
signaling about unconventional future interest
rate policy as compensation for past target misses.
CONCLUSIONS
We have shown that a canonical New
Keynesian model of the monetary transmission
mechanism can be extended in a fairly simple
way to allow analysis of additional dimensions
of central bank policy that have been at center
stage during the recent global financial crisis—
variations in the size and composition of the
central bank balance sheet and in the interest
rate paid on reserves—alongside the traditional
monetary policy issue of the choice of an operating
target for the federal funds rate (or some similar
overnight inter-bank rate elsewhere). We have also
considered the consequences for monetary policy
analysis both of nonzero credit spreads all of the
time and of financial disruptions that greatly
increase the size of those spreads for a period of
time; we have also considered the consequences
of the fact the zero lower bound for short-term
nominal interest rates is sometimes a binding
constraint on interest rate policy.
One of our most important conclusions is that
these issues can be addressed in a framework that
represents a straightforward extension of the kind
of model often used for monetary policy analysis
in the past. This allows both the considerations
emphasized in the traditional literature and the
more novel considerations brought to the fore by
recent events to be taken into account, within a
single coherent framework. This integration is
particularly important, in our view, for clear think-
ing about the way in which the transition from
the current emergency policy regime to a more
customary policy framework should be handled
as financial conditions normalize. Because of the
importance of expectations regarding future policy
in determining market outcomes now, we believe
that clarity about “exit strategy” is important for
the success of policy even during periods of
severe disruption of financial markets.
Another important implication of our model
is that interest rate policy should continue to be
a central focus of monetary policy deliberations,
despite the existence of the other dimensions of
policy discussed here, and despite the existence
of time-varying credit frictions that complicate
the relationship between the central bank’s policy
rate and financial conditions more broadly. While
welfare can also be affected by reserve-supply
policy, we argue that this dimension of policy
should be determined by a simple principle that
does not require any discretionary adjustments
in light of changing economic conditions: Inter  -
Cúrdia and Woodford
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW JULY/AUGUST 2010 261mediaries should be satiated in reserves at all
times, by maintaining an interest rate on reserves
at or close to the current target for the policy rate.
And while welfare can similarly be affected
by central bank credit policy, to the extent that
nontrivial credit frictions exist, we nonetheless
believe that under normal circumstances a corner
solution (“Treasuries only”) is likely to represent
the optimal composition of the central bank bal-
ance sheet. Decisions about active credit policy
then will be necessary only under relatively
unusual circumstances, and it will be desirable
to phase out special credit programs relatively
rapidly after the disturbances that have justified
their introduction. We thus do not anticipate that
it should be necessary to routinely make state-
contingent adjustments of central bank policy
along multiple dimensions, even if recent events
suggest that it is desirable for central banks to have
the power to act along additional dimensions
under sufficiently exigent circumstances.
Finally, our results suggest that the traditional
emphasis in interest rate policy deliberations on
the consequences of monetary policy for the pro-
jected evolution of inflation and aggregate real
activity is not mistaken, even taking into account
the consequences for the monetary transmission
mechanism of time-varying credit frictions. At
least in the context of the simple model of credit
frictions proposed here, optimal interest rate
policy can be characterized to a reasonable degree
of approximation by a target criterion that involves
the paths of inflation and of an appropriately
defined output gap, but no other endogenous
target variables. This does not mean that central
banks should remain indifferent toward changes
in financial conditions; to the contrary, credit
spreads (and perhaps other measures of financial
market distortions as well) should be closely
monitored and taken into account in judging the
forward path of interest rate policy necessary for
conformity with the target criterion. However,
financial variables need not be taken themselves
as targets of monetary policy.
The main respect in which the appropriate
target criterion for interest rate policy should be
modified to take account of the possibility of finan-
cial disruptions is by aiming at a target path for
the price level (ideally, for an output gap–adjusted
price level), rather than for a target rate of inflation
looking forward, as a forward-looking inflation
target accommodates a permanent decline in the
price level after a period of one-sided target misses
due to a binding zero lower bound on interest
rates. Our analysis implies that a credible com-
mitment to the right kind of “exit strategy” should
substantially improve the ability of monetary
policy to deal with the unusual challenges posed
by a binding zero lower bound during a deep finan-
cial crisis; and, to the extent that this is true, the
development of an integrated framework for policy
deliberations, suitable both for crisis periods and
for more normal times, is a matter of considerable
urgency for the world’s central banks.
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